This paper studies the existence of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games, a general class of strategic games succinctly representing the players’ private costs. These games are defined relative to a finite set of resources and the strategy set of each player corresponds to a set of subsets of resources. The cost of a resource is an arbitrary function of the load vector of a certain subset of resources. As our main result, we give complete characterizations of the cost functions guaranteeing the existence of pure Nash equilibria for weighted and unweighted players, respectively. For unweighted players, pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist for any choice of the players’ strategy space if and only if the cost of each resource is an arbitrary function of the load of the resource itself and linear in the load of all other resources where the linear coefficients of mutual influence of different resources are symmetric. This implies in particular that for any other cost structure there is a resource graph game that does not have a pure Nash equilibrium. For weighted games where players have intrinsic weights and the cost of each resource depends on the aggregated weight of its users, pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist if and only if the cost of a resource is linear in all resource loads, and the linear factors of mutual influence are symmetric, or there is no interaction among resources and the cost is an exponential function of the local resource load. We further discuss the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games showing that for unweighted games where pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, it is coNP-complete to decide for a given strategy profile whether it is a pure Nash equilibrium. For general resource graph games, we prove that the decision whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists is Σ p 2 -complete.

Several problems in planning and reactive synthesis can be reduced to the analysis of two-player quantitative graph games. {\em Optimization} is one form of analysis. We argue that in many cases it may be better to replace the optimization problem with the {\em satisficing problem}, where instead of searching for optimal solutions, the goal is to search for solutions that adhere to a given threshold bound. This work defines and investigates the satisficing problem on a two-player graph game with the discounted-sum cost model. We show that while the satisficing problem can be solved using numerical methods just like the optimization problem, this approach does not render compelling benefits over optimization. When the discount factor is, however, an integer, we present another approach to satisficing, which is purely based on automata methods. We show that this approach is algorithmically more performant -- both theoretically and empirically -- and demonstrates the broader applicability of satisficing overoptimization.

A significantly complete account of the complexity underlying the computation of relevant solution concepts in compact coalitional games is provided. The starting investigation point is the setting of graph games, about which various long-standing open problems were stated in the literature. The paper gives an answer to most of them, and in addition provides new insights on this setting, by stating a number of complexity results about some relevant generalizations and specializations. The presented results also pave the way towards precisely carving the tractability frontier characterizing computation problems on compact coalitional games.